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INTRODUCTION
For decades, the American legal academy has engaged in a lively
debate over the foundations of tort law. 1 A schism between economic
theorists and their critics has defined the fundamental arc of the dispute.2
Richard Posner, perhaps the most well-known proponent of the lawand-economics movement, conceives of tort law as an instrument for
maximizing wealth.3 According to this view, tort law’s primary aim is to
impose liability in ways that incentivize people to take cost-justified
precautions that maximize societal wealth. 4 Viewing themselves as
committed to a classic form of rationality, economic theorists recognize
that they cannot do anything about sunk costs and, therefore, turn their
attention toward incentivizing people to take cost-justified precautions on
a forward-looking basis.5 As Posner put it: “Rational people base their
decisions on expectations of the future rather than on regrets about the
past. They treat bygones as bygones.”6
The most prominent critique of economic tort theory argues that tort
law is all about achieving corrective justice by providing remedies in
response to wrongs.7 According to this view, tort law has a fundamentally

1. John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 L. & PHIL.
1, 2 (2011) [hereinafter Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1].
2. John Gardner, Tort Law and Its Theory, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 1 (John Tasioulas ed., 2020) [hereinafter Gardner, Tort Law and Its Theory].
3. Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 187, 201 (1981) [hereinafter Posner, The Concept]; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 1, 16 (1987) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW]; see also Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson, Rights and Private
Law, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 23 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012) [hereinafter Nolan
& Robertson, Rights and Private Law]; Michael D. Green, Apportionment, Victim Reliance, and Fraud:
A Comment, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1043–44 (2006);
4. LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, supra note 3, at 293; Gregory
C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 655
(2019) [hereinafter Keating, Pressing Precaution].
5. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27 (1970)
[hereinafter CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS]; Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97
YALE L.J. 1233, 1237–38, 1240–41 (1988) [hereinafter Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law]; Benjamin
Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 625 (Jules L. Coleman et al., 2004) [hereinafter Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law]; Gregory
C Keating, Is the Role of Tort to Repair Wrongful Losses?, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 367 (Donal
Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Keating, Repair Wrongful
Losses?].
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7 (Aspen Publishers 2007) (1973)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW].
7. JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO
LEGAL THEORY (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE]; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (1995) [hereinafter WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE
LAW]; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Thoroughly Modern Tort Theory, 134 HARV.
L. REV. F. 184, 186 (2021) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Thoroughly Modern Tort Theory].
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backward-looking focus on remedying wrongs between parties who are
situated bilaterally.8 As explained by Jules Coleman, the notion that
people should be responsible for repairing the wrongful losses they cause
others to suffer is the “principle that holds together and makes sense of
tort law.”9 For these reasons, defenders of this view reject economic
theorists’ forward-looking philosophy of tort liability as seeking to
incentivize the taking of cost-justified precautionary behavior.10
Despite the strength of this critique, economic theorists have a response
available to them. Although corrective justice describes the reparative
aspect of tort law, it does not provide an account of the field’s primary
norms.11 The violation of a primary right might require a remedy, but
corrective justice does not tell us why and when it is important to
recognize and protect such rights in the first place.12 Although some
theorists claim that it is not their department to tell us whether tort law’s
primary rights are sound,13 they cannot remain agnostic on this topic.14
Our obligation to not violate others’ primary rights is analytically prior to
our secondary obligation to provide a remedy when we wrong others. 15
The view that tort law’s primary rights are justified by the principle of
wealth maximization “may be asinine, the typical answer of one who
knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. But, at least it is
an answer. Whereas ‘corrective justice,’ as it stands, is no answer at all.”16
Unfortunately, to date, this split remains unresolved because scholars
on each side of this debate have devoted too much attention to refining
their respective positions and too little time on setting the stage for
resolving the dispute.17 Several scholars—perhaps most notably Gregory
Keating and the late John Gardner—have attempted to overcome this
seemingly intractable schism by refocusing our attention on the primary
8. Goldberg & Zipursky, Thoroughly Modern Tort Theory, supra note 7, at 186; COLEMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 15; Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as
Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 59 (2003) [hereinafter Weinrib, Punishment and
Disgorgement]; Gregory C. Keating, Corrective Justice: Sovereign or Subordinate?, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW 44 (Andrew S. Gold et al. eds., 2020) [hereinafter Keating,
Sovereign or Subordinate?].
9. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 62.
10. Scott Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law Do? What Can It Do?, 47 VAL. U.L. REV. 99, 104
(2012) [hereinafter Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law Do?]; Gregory C. Keating, The Priority of Respect
Over Repair, 18 LEGAL THEORY 293, 305 (2012) [hereinafter Keating, The Priority of Respect over
Repair].
11. Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 52.
12. Id.
13. Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note 1, at 3.
14. See Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?, supra note 5, at 369.
15. Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?, supra note 5, at 369; ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND
RIGHTS 336 (2007) [hereinafter STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS].
16. Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note 1, at 17.
17. Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 37.
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rights at the heart of tort law.18
Inspired by Keating and Gardner’s work, my aim in this article is to
explain how philosopher Alan Gewirth’s principle of generic consistency
can serve as the foundation of tort law’s primary rights. Gewirth’s theory
articulates a rational standard governing the rights and duties we have
with respect to one another.19 According to the principle of generic
consistency, humans are the sort of beings that constitute their agency by
acting in pursuit of some goal, which requires them to have a minimum
amount of freedom and well-being.20 Further, humans are logically
committed to claiming a right to at least a modicum of freedom and wellbeing because it would be contradictory to hold that we need certain
goods to constitute our agency while also claiming that others may deny
our having access to such goods.21 Finally, insofar as we justify the rights
we claim for ourselves by appeal to our most basic and generic needs, we
must recognize—on pain of contradiction—that any other human agents
needing the sort of goods we require also have a right to those same
goods.22 In other words, if I claim that the source or foundation of my
rights are the needs I have as a rational human agent, I am logically
committed to recognizing that any other being with those same needs also
has a right to the sort of goods to which I claim a right.23
To be sure, Gewirth’s principle of generic consistency is similar to
Immanuel Kant’s theory of morality and reason. Kant and Gewirth regard
the supreme principle of practical reason as providing the cardinal
standard for the obligations we owe to one another.24 However, Kant
conceives of an ideal form of pure reason that guides humans’ practical
reasoning without influence from “factors belonging to [our] nature as
physically embodied beings.”25 In other words, the Kantian theory of pure
practical reason abstracts away from the contingent needs and purposes
of human agents.26 The principle of generic consistency, on the other
hand, is compatible with the requirements of the rational standard
governing all human action being derived from the contingent desires or
purposes motivating human agents to pursue whatever ends they set for

18. Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note 1, at 1; Keating, The Priority of Respect
Over Repair, supra note 10, at 295.
19. ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY x (1978) [hereinafter GEWIRTH, REASON AND
MORALITY].
20. Id. supra note 19, at 63–66.
21. Id. at 81.
22. Id. at 104–12.
23. Id.
24. DERYCK BEYLEVELD AND ROGER BROWNSWORD, HUMAN DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS AND
BIOLAW 87 (2001) [hereinafter BEYLEVELD AND BROWNSWORD, BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW].
25. Id. at 105.
26. Id. at 100, 104–05.
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themselves.27
Although much more can be said about the similarities and differences
between Gewirth and Kant, my focus here is on the principle of generic
consistency. As a rational foundation for all rights and duties we have
with respect to one another, Gewirth’s theory supplies a framework for
articulating the obligations governing all human action.28 Included among
the human actions governed by the principle of generic consistency is the
activity of lawmaking, which is the enterprise of guiding human conduct
through the creation of legal rules.29 In this way, Gewirth’s theory can
overcome the difficulty corrective justice theorists have in providing an
account of tort law’s foundations. Further, the principle of generic
consistency can explain tort law’s backward-looking concern with
remedying wrongs in a way that economic theorists cannot.
Several European legal scholars have recognized the principle of
generic consistency’s promising implications. 30 For example, the
“Sheffield School” refers a group of scholars who are perhaps the most
sympathetic contemporary proponents of the principle of generic
consistency.31 Although the main protagonists of this group are no longer
at the University of Sheffield, they have spawned growing number of
scholars who have become interested in the principle of generic
consistency’s applications to various areas of law, including tort law and
bioethics.32
Notwithstanding this group’s influence, Gewirth’s theory remains
mostly unknown to American legal academics. One likely factor
contributing to the lack of familiarity with Gewirth’s work is the
prominence of legal realism in America. Lawmaking, according to this
view, is a state-imposed system of incentives and sanctions for resolving
policy questions rather than an exercise of abstract reasoning about legal
principles.33 Despite the existence of high-profile alternatives to this
pragmatic conception of law, its influence in the American legal academy
27. Id. at 104–05.
28. DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT 120, 170, 180
(Sheffield Academic Press 1994) (1986) [hereinafter BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, LAW AS A MORAL
JUDGMENT]; Deryck Beyleveld, The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human
Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. REV. 1, 2 (2011) [hereinafter Beyleveld, The Principle of Generic Consistency].
29. BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT, supra note 28, at 120, 170, 180.
30. BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT, supra note 28, at 120.
31. Deryck Beyleveld, Sheffield Natural Law School, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (Mortimer Sellers & Stephan Kirste eds., 2020) [hereinafter Beyleveld,
Sheffield Natural Law School]; Bev Clucas, The Sheffield School and Discourse Theory: Divergences and
Similarities in Legal Idealism/Anti-Positivism, 19 RATIO JURIS. 230, 233 (2006) [Clucas, The Sheffield
School and Discourse Theory].
32. Beyleveld, Sheffield Natural Law School, supra note 31, at 1.
33. John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640,
1642 (2012) [hereinafter Goldberg, Pragmatism and Private Law] (citations omitted).
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has arguably been pervasive enough to hinder the flourishing of a more
reason-oriented understanding of law drawing on Gewirth’s work. 34
Another possible reason for the lack of familiarity with the principle of
generic consistency concerns the highly technical presentation of
Gewirth’s theory.35 Gewirth claimed that his core argument can be
understood by nearly everyone, but his work is perhaps most accessible
to those with very specific philosophical interests. 36 Mischaracterizations
of his view are other possible explanations for his theory not being more
widely known.37
Regardless of the precise reason(s) for this unfortunate reality,
Gewirth’s work has promising implications for American tort theory. This
article will not explore the principle of generic consistency’s possible
applications to tort law’s doctrinal dimensions. For example, I do not
illustrate how the principle of generic consistency can help us decide in
any given case whether to apply strict liability or the fault standard, if a
defendant breached their duty of care owed to a plaintiff, and more.
Instead, my goals here are more preliminary and focused on the principle
of generic consistency’s ability to illuminate our understanding of tort
law’s conceptual roots.
This article proceeds in four parts. First, Section I provides a bird’s eye
view of the schism between economic theorists and their critics. Section
II illustrates how the principle of generic consistency can serve as the
foundation of law. I explain in Section III how the principle of generic
consistency can help set the stage for moving past the debate in the
American legal academy over the foundations of tort law by providing an
account of the field’s primary rights. Finally, Section IV considers a few
alternatives to the principle of generic consistency.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE IMPASSE
BURDENING MODERN TORT THEORY
In many ways, tort theory is very old.38 Some contemporary tort
scholars hold views like those expounded by Aristotle nearly 2,500 years
ago.39 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle described corrective justice
34. See Goldberg, Pragmatism and Private Law, supra note 34, at 1645–51.
35. Alan White, If You Can Understand This Essay, Then You Have Moral Rights and Duties, 3
OPEN PHIL. 161, 161 (2021) [hereinafter White, If You Can Understand This Essay].
36. Id.
37. Id. at 167–69.
38. David G. Owen, Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAW 2 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) [hereinafter Owen, Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law];
Christina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1326–27 (2017) [hereinafter Tilley,
Tort Law Inside Out].
39. Owen, Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law, supra note 38, at 1.
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as being concerned with resolving wrongful transactions through the
addition and subtraction of resources.40 In the centuries since he wrote the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s skeletal conception of corrective justice
has undergone important developments by various scholars. 41
In other ways, though, tort theory is relatively young compared to
contract, property, and other foundational areas of common law.42
America’s version of tort law is widely understood to have emerged in
the second half of the nineteenth century.43 By that time, industrial
accidents had become inevitable by-products of people’s professional and
personal lives.44 As a result, traditional tort doctrines came under intense
strain.45 Before the industrial revolution, traditional tort claims for
battery, slander, malpractice, and more typically arose in response to
situations where “A [harms] B” by violating some conventional standard
of conduct.46 Fault was perhaps the most important element of tort
liability in the pre-industrial era. 47 In rough terms, the fault principle
required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the defendant was both negligent
(i.e., having failed to observe a standard of conduct) and the cause of their
injury.48 Holmes believed that the fault principle was well suited for the
world in which harm typically arises out of “isolated” and “ungeneralized
wrongs”; Keating helpfully refers to this world as the “world of acts.”49
According to Holmes, the world of acts was typified by the sort of isolated

40. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 87–89 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2000).
41. Owen, Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law, supra note 38, at 1.
42. G. Edward White, The Emergence and Doctrinal Development of Tort Law, 1870-1930, 11 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 463, 469–75 (2014) [hereinafter White, The Emergence]; John C.P. Goldberg,
Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 517 (2003) [hereinafter Goldberg, Twentieth-Century
Tort Theory].
43. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467 (2d ed. 1985) (1973).
44. G.E. White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century: An Historical Perspective, 32 V ILL. L.
REV. 1265, 1269 (1987) [hereinafter White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century]. The increased
prevalence of industrial accidents occurred most notably in the workplace, and employees had mostly
become responsible for shouldering the burden of such accidents. Id.; White, The Emergence, supra note
42, at 463.
45. White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century, supra note 44, at 1269–70.
46. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, supra note 42, at 517–19.
47. Nathan Issacs, Fault and Liability: Two Views of Legal Development, 31 HARV . L. REV. 954,
974 (1918); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 19 (1980)
[hereinafter WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA].
48. See White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century, supra note 44, at 1270; White, The
Emergence, supra note 42, at 463–64. Additionally, plaintiffs generally bore the burden of demonstrating
that they were neither negligent themselves nor had they assumed the risk of being injured by the
defendant. White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century, supra note 44, at 1270–71; White, The
Emergence, supra note 42, at 463–64.
49. Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1266 (1997) [hereinafter Keating, The Idea of Fairness] (citations omitted); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law].
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harms that commonly occurred prior to the industrial revolution.50 For
example, the dogfight in Brown v. Kendall51 “arose out of a chance
encounter between unrelated parties neither of whose activities were large
enough to make such misfortunes commonplace and expected.” 52 The
fault principle served the world of acts well because it struck a fair balance
between the liberty of prospective tortfeasors and potential victims’
security.53
As the industrial revolution continued throughout the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, tort cases increasingly concerned instances
of generalizable activities where defendants did not violate any standard
of conduct recognized by law.54 Insofar as such activities were the result
of organized and predictable activities (e.g., railroad transportation or the
increasing presence of heavy machinery in workplaces), they were
distinguishable from Holmes’s conception of the world of ungeneralized
acts.55 The world of activities presented judges with questions concerning
the “social desirability or undesirability of particular forms of conduct.”56
The fault principle’s focus on negligence and causation seemed illequipped to address this changing landscape. 57 As a result, plaintiffs’
ability to receive compensation for injuries resulting from generalized and
non-negligent activities was severely impaired.58 Additionally,
defendants were not being held accountable for the harm resulting from
their actions.59
In response to this trend, several movements developed.60 For example,
workers compensation schemes arose as a means of ensuring that
employees received compensation for the apparently inevitable, but
costly, result of accidents occurring in the modern workplace. 61 The first
50. Keating, The Idea of Fairness, supra note 49, at 1331 (citations omitted); Holmes, Jr., The
Path of the Law, supra note 49, at 467.
51. Keating, The Idea of Fairness, supra note 49, at 1331 (citing 1560 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850)).
52. Gregory C. Keating, The Heroic Enterprise of the Asbestos Cases, 38 SW. U.L. REV. 623, 629
(2008) [hereinafter Keating, The Heroic Enterprise of the Asbestos Cases].
53. Id. at 630–32 (citations omitted).
54. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, supra note 42, at 525–26.
55. Keating, The Heroic Enterprise of the Asbestos Cases, supra note 52, at 630–32 (citations
omitted).
56. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, supra note 42, at 524; Holmes, Jr., The Path of the
Law, supra note 49, at 467.
57. White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century, supra note 44, at 1271–74; White, The
Emergence, supra note 42, at 464; Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous
Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 266–73 (1987) [hereinafter Nolan & Ursin, The
Revitalization].
58. White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century, supra note 44, at 1271.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1271–74; White, The Emergence, supra note 42, at 464; Nolan & Ursin, The
Revitalization, supra note 57, at 266–73.
61. White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century, supra note 44, at 1268–77; George L. Priest,
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half of the twentieth century also saw rising interest in expanding strict
liability—which had historically been reserved for ultrahazardous
activities—to serve as a more widely accepted alternative to fault as the
standard for tort liability.62 Around the same time, the principle of
comparative negligence became increasingly prevalent and appeared
poised to reform the tort system.63 Whereas strict liability and workers
compensation systems proposed abandoning the fault standard,
comparative negligence aimed to quantify and compare degrees of
negligence according to mathematical principles. 64
These and other developments kicked off a debate over tort law’s
fundamental aims and norms.65 It appeared that tort law had developed
haphazardly in response to social and economic realities and, as a result,
the field could not be tethered to any deep logic or coherence. 66
Consequently, tort scholars and practitioners began to wonder whether
the field’s doctrines could be organized around an overarching set of
doctrinal principles.67
In the middle of the 20th century, as this debate continued to unfold,
economic theorists surveyed the motley collection of tort doctrines and
claimed that they could provide a comprehensive explanation of the
field.68
A. Economic Analysis
In 1967, Guido Calabresi introduced the term “cheapest cost avoider”
to articulate a distinctive conception of tort law.69 Economic analysis,
according to Calabresi, provided the best tool for reducing risk and fairly
allocating the cost of accidents.70 Calabresi proposed replacing “the core
The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 466–70 (1985) [hereinafter Priest, The Invention].
62. White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century, supra note 44, at 1277–84; Nolan & Ursin, The
Revitalization, supra note 57, at 258; Priest, The Invention, supra note 61, at 470–75.
63. White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century, supra note 44, at 1284.
64. Id.
65. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 57, at 147.
66. John Fabian Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, 1 J.
TORT L. 1, 16–34 (2007).
67. Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA.
L. REV. 851, 853–56 (1980) [hereinafter Posner & Landes, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law].
68. LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, supra note 3, at 1; Richard
Posner, The Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Catherine M. Sharkey, Modern Torts:
Preventing Harms, Not Recognizing Wrongs, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (2021); Gardner, Tort Law
and Its Theory, supra note 2, at 1.
69. See Guido Calabresi, Changes for Automobile Claims? Views and Overviews, 1967 U. ILL.
L.F. 600, 608; CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 5, at 135; Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi
and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 85, 86 (2005).
70. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Thoroughly Modern Tort Theory, supra note 7, at 185. He was
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of tort doctrine with simpler, more direct liability rules that, on a statistical
basis, would . . . load[] liability on the most appropriate actors (the
cheapest cost avoiders).”71 His ultimate aim was to use an economic
analysis to replace the fault system in traditional tort jurisprudence with a
“mixed system” relying heavily on strict liability.72
A decade later, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner argued that
tort law’s aim was to assign liability in a manner that maximized the
wealth available to society.73 Posner and Landes agreed with Calabresi’s
claim that tort law is best viewed through an economic lens. However,
whereas Calabresi’s project was normative, claiming that the law of torts
should impose liability on the cheapest cost avoider, Posner and Landes
undertook a descriptive project to explain tort law.74 They viewed tort law
as maximizing societal wealth by incentivizing people to take costjustified precautions on a forward-looking basis.75
Despite the differences between distinct economic theories, they share
the view that tort law is fundamentally oriented toward “minimizing the
combined costs of preventing and paying for accidents.”76 Viewing
themselves as committed to a classic form of rationality, economic
theorists recognize that they cannot do anything about sunk costs resulting
from past liability schemes that failed to achieve their goals.77 As Posner
put it:
[C]ost to an economist is a forward-looking concept. “Sunk” (incurred)
costs do not affect a rational actor’s decisions. . . . Rational people base
their decisions on expectations of the future rather than on regrets about
the past. They treat bygones as bygones.78

For these reasons, economic theorists turn their attention toward

careful to note, though, that he does not necessarily agree with everything an economist would have to
say. See CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 5, at 72. Although economic analysis provides
helpful strategies for addressing certain problems in tort law, Calabresi thought other quandaries—such
as those posed by identity or morality—are not most appropriately resolved with the help of an economic
analysis. Id. at 18–20.
71. See Hylton, supra note 69, at 89 (citing CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 5,
at 312).
72. Id. at 89 (citing CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 5, at 311–18).
73. See LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, supra note 3, at 1 16;
Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 5, at 625.
74. See Posner & Landes, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, supra note 67, at 857;
Gardner, Tort Law and Its Theory, supra note 2, at 3; Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, supra note 38, at 1329.
75. See LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, supra note 3, at 28, 293;
Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law Do?, supra note 10, at 100; Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?, supra
note 5, at 367; Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 4, at 655.
76. Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 40.
77. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, at 7; Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?,
supra note 5, at 367 (citations omitted).
78. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, at 7.
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minimizing expected costs in the future.79
Granted, economic theorists acknowledge that there is a backwardlooking aspect to tort law.80 They claim that redress needs to be provided
to actual victims (as opposed to exacting a fee from injurers to fund
various sorts of public works).81 This acknowledgement is based on the
thought that redress is needed because if plaintiffs do not receive
compensation, they might take precautions (e.g., overinvesting in their
own safety) that are not cost-justified.82 Here, economic theorists are
appealing to a form of rule-utilitarianism.83 For rule-utilitarians, a law has
utility when its net benefit outweighs the harm resulting from intruding
on the rights of any individual or group.84 This analysis takes into account
the “widespread social insecurity and anxiety that would result if” the
violation of certain rights were generally permitted.85 Endorsing this line
of reasoning allows economic theorists to claim that their conception of
tort law is able to accommodate the field’s bilateral structure.
Notwithstanding these backward-looking concerns, economic theorists
claim that tort law’s remedial features do not tell a story about what
constitutes a wrong in the first place.86 The economic view of tort law
defines wrongful conduct as behavior that fails to conform with principles
that “bring[] about an efficient (in the sense of wealth-maximizing)
allocation of resources by correcting externalities in the market’s
allocation of resources.”87 It only makes sense to hold a party liable for
their past wrongs if doing so will avert future harm. 88 So, economic
theorists acknowledge that tort law has a remedial function of providing
redress for past wrongs.89 Nevertheless, they claim that tort law’s
remedial function is subordinate to its foundational principle of
promoting an efficient allocation of resources by incentivizing people to

79. Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?, supra note 5, at 367 (citations omitted). According to the
economic view of tort law, the obligations people have toward one another matter only to the degree such
obligations serve as wealth-maximizing instruments. See Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note
8, at 43.
80. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, at 192.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Gardner, Tort Law and its Theory, supra note 2, at 14–15.
84. Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice, and Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
LAW 160–61 (David G. Owen eds., 1995) [Wright, Right, Justice, and Tort Law].
85. Id. at 161.
86. Posner, The Concept, supra note 3, at 201.
87. Id.
88. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 295.
89. Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 39–40; Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law
Do?, supra note 10, at 100 (citing LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, supra
note 3, at 28); Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?, supra note 5, at 367.
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observe cost-justified precautions on a forward-looking basis.90
It is not hard to see why an economic theory of tort law became, and
has remained, so dominant.91 Economics provides a powerful analytic
framework for understanding the field.92 In the middle of the twentieth
century, it was unclear whether various tort doctrines could be organized
around a coherent aim.93 Economic theorists answered that question in the
affirmative by claiming that tort law is fundamentally about wealth
maximization.94
B. Non-Economic Analysis
Of course, economics is not the only discipline that can be leveraged
to provide a unified understanding of tort law’s aims.95 Arguably,
corrective justice is the most influential non-economic theory of tort
law.96 The theory’s leading proponents conceive of tort law as being
centrally concerned with the duty of repair generated by the violation of
primary rights97 prohibiting certain forms of conduct (e.g., assault,
battery, and more).98 Although there are several distinct flavors of
corrective justice, it will be helpful to fix ideas by focusing on the version
developed by Jules Coleman, who is one of the theory’s most prominent
defenders.99
90. Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 39–40; Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law
Do?, supra note 10, at 100 (citing LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, supra
note 3, at 28); Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?, supra note 5, at 367. Economic theorists are not the
only scholars who view corrective justice as playing a subordinate role in tort law. Richard Epstein, for
example, views a natural right to liberty as the primary norm upon which tort law rests, and corrective
justice is implicated when that norm is violated. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT
LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMULATION OF TORT LAW (1980). Similarly, George Fletcher claims that
corrective justice is subordinate to a Rawlsian conception of tort as a fair distribution of risk. See George
P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
91. Sharkey, supra note 68, at 1424.
92. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 5, at 626; Peter C. Carstensen, Explaining
Tort Law: The Economic Theory of Landes and Posner, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (1988).
93. Green, supra note 3, at 1043–44.
94. LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, supra note 3, at 1, 16.
95. Carstensen, supra note 92, at 1162.
96. Goldberg & Zipursky, Thoroughly Modern Tort Theory, supra note 7, at 185–86.
97. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 22; Jules Coleman, The Practice of
Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 56–57 (David G. Owen ed., 1995)
[hereinafter Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice]; WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra
note 7, at 140–42, 197–98; John CP Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility in the Law
of Torts, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 257 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012) [hereinafter
Goldberg & Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility in the Law of Torts]; Zipursky, Philosophy of Private
Law, supra note 5, at 627.
98. Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note 1, at 33; STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS,
supra note 15, at 336.
99. Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?, supra note 5, at 375; Keating, The Priority of Respect Over
Repair, supra note 10, at 301.
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Coleman rejects the conclusion that tort law’s remedial function plays
merely an instrumental role in maximizing wealth.100 He complains that
economic theory’s forward-looking preoccupation with maximizing
wealth fails to account for the field’s backward-looking concern with
remedying wrongs.101 Simply because a party is the “cheapest costavoider with respect to a class of future losses” does not justify imposing
liability if that party is not responsible for violating plaintiffs’ primary
rights.102 For these reasons, Coleman and like-minded theorists do not
view the principle that wrongful losses should be repaired as subordinate
to the aim of wealth maximization.103 Rather, the “principle that holds
together and makes sense of . . . tort law” is a concern with seeing that
those responsible for unjustifiably harming another are responsible for
repairing wrongful losses.104 In this way, corrective justice has a dual
relationship to tort law: it grounds the practice of holding wrongdoers
accountable while also giving “content to” and making the principle of
corrective justice “explicit” in tort law.105 Hence, according to proponents
of this view, economic theorists cannot account for tort law’s
fundamentally backward-looking and bilateral focus on remedying the
violation of primary rights.106
Economically inclined scholars can respond by claiming that their
conception of tort law can accommodate these criticisms. As indicated
earlier, economic theories of tort law require that a wronged plaintiff
receive some form of redress.107 The rationale for doing so is that failing
to provide redress would incentivize victims to overinvest in safety
precautions that are not cost-justified.108
But this response is descriptively and normatively deficient. The
100. Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 43.
101. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, supra note 5, at 1244; Keating, Sovereign or
Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 43–45; John Oberdiek, Introduction: Philosophical Foundations of the
Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014)
[hereinafter Oberdiek, Introduction]; Goldberg & Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility in the Law of Torts,
supra note 97, at 257; Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note 1, at 2.
102. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 303 (emphasis omitted).
103. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, supra note 97, at 62; Keating, Sovereign or
Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 43.
104. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, supra note 97, at 62; see also COLEMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 43–45, 58, 62; Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note
8, at 43–44.
105. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 58, 62.
106. Id. at 15; Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, supra note 5, at 1244; Keating, Sovereign or
Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 43, 44–45; Oberdiek, Introduction, supra note 101, at 2; Goldberg &
Zipursky, Thoroughly Modern Tort Theory, supra note 7, at 186; Goldberg & Zipursky, Rights and
Responsibility in the Law of Torts, supra note 97, at 257; Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra
note 1, at 2.
107. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, § 6.10, at 192.
108. Id.
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structure of tort law is concerned with ensuring that the party responsible
for the wrong provides redress to a victim. 109 According to economically
inclined scholars, the individual or entity responsible for a plaintiff’s
injury might also be best positioned to maximize wealth for society and,
therefore, be the appropriate bearer of liability.110 In this way, the
economic justification for holding the actual injurer liable is contingent
on their also being the cheapest cost-avoider.111 This contingent link
between injurer and victim does not appear to be an accurate description
of tort law, which has an interest in holding injurers liable. In addition to
these descriptive limitations, the economic theory is normatively
deficient.112 An economic analysis of tort law does not take seriously the
violation of individuals’ rights.113 According to economic theorists,
protecting people’s rights is incidental to wealth maximization. 114 If
holding a defendant responsible for a wrong will not incentivize future
deterrence, the economic perspective does not view liability as
appropriate despite the fact that a plaintiff’s right has been violated. 115
Contra economic theorists, corrective justice claims that the reason we
hold a defendant liable for harming a plaintiff is because doing so is fair;
it is not because doing so realizes the social objective of incentivizing
behavior that maximizes cost-justified precautions.116 Economic
theorists’ justification for holding injurers liable for their victims’ injuries
fails to account for an important normative relationship between the
parties.117 Many of these concerns have been discussed elsewhere and
need not be restated here.118 For our purposes, we merely need to note that
a rule-utilitarian justification of tort law provides only “contingent or
derivative” protection for individuals’ fundamental rights.119

109. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, supra note 5, at 1244.
110. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 305.
111. Id. Further, it is not clear on this view why the plaintiff is the only person entitled to sue; any
member of the community with an interest in setting liability standards to optimize cost-justified
precautions could have the requisite standing to sue. See also Hershovitz, What Does Tort Law Do?, supra
note 10.
112. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 330.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 295.
116. Id. at 303; Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 44 (citations omitted).
117. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 66–67.
118. Id. at 12–24; WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 7, at 46–48; Wright, Right,
Justice, and Tort Law, supra note 84, at 161–62. John Rawls claimed that utilitarianism should be rejected
as a theory of justice because it allows a few to be sacrificed in the name of a “larger sum of advantages
enjoyed by many.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF Justice 3 (1971).
119. Wright, Right, Justice, and Tort Law, supra note 84, at 161.
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C. The Impasse
As Keating, Gardner, and others have noted, although it seems correct
that analyzing tort law in economic terms fails to explain the bilateral
nature of the field,120 defenders of corrective justice have not provided an
adequate account of tort law’s primary rights.121 Coleman goes so far as
to suggest that tort law’s primary rights are irreducibly idiosyncratic. 122
Here is Coleman:
I reject the suggestion that an adequate account of tort practices requires
that there be a general theory of first-order duties from which we can derive
them all systematically. Indeed, I am dubious about the prospects for such
a theory. On my view, much of the content of the first-order duties that are
protected in tort law is created and formed piecemeal in the course of our
manifold social and economic interactions. . . . But while I thus have my
doubts about the prospects for a general comprehensive theory of
enforceable private duties, I certainly haven’t proved that such an account
could not succeed.123

Without an account of why we should correct the violation of a primary
right, corrective justice lacks a justification for the principles upon which
tort law is founded.124
Economically inclined scholars claim that their theory of wealth
maximization provides a complete account of tort law’s aims.125
Economic theorists recognize that corrective justice is a necessary aspect
of tort law because, without it, people will not be incentivized to observe
the rules that the field stipulates.126 But absent a standard explaining what
counts as wrongful conduct, corrective justice is incomplete. 127 So,
although corrective justice is a necessary aspect of tort law, economic
theorists claim that corrective justice is a subordinate feature of the field
in need of validation rather than a justification for tort law. 128
However, as indicated above, wealth maximization fails to explain the
duty of repair owed by a particular defendant to a specific plaintiff.129 So,
120. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 302.
121. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 34–35; Keating, Sovereign or
Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 48–49.
122. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 34–35.
123. Id.
124. Posner, The Concept, supra note 3, at 201; Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note
1, at 14.
125. Posner, The Concept, supra note 3, at 206; Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note
1, at 16.
126. Posner, The Concept, supra note 3, at 201.
127. Id.
128. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 301.
129. Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?, supra note 5, at 379; Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part
1, supra note 1, at 17.
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economic theorists have not supplied an adequate account of tort law’s
backward-looking and bilateral focus.130 At the same time, although tort
law necessarily includes a remedial component, corrective justice does
not provide a justification for the primary norms underpinning the field.131
Unfortunately, scholars on each side of this debate have devoted too
much attention to refining their critique of their opponents while spending
too little time setting the stage for resolving the dispute.132 Thus, as
Keating proposes, “[p]hilosophically inclined theorists of tort need to turn
their attention toward the field’s primary norms, and the reasons and
values that either succeed or fail in justifying them.”133
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LAW
We can follow Keating’s advice by developing a justification of tort
law’s primary norms with the help of Gewirth’s work. The argument for
Gewirth’s principle of generic consistency leverages two important
concepts, the first of which is the notion of a prospective purposive
agent.134 The basic idea animating this concept is that all humans, simply
because they are human, are the sort of beings that constitute their agency
by acting for the purpose of achieving some goal or goals they set for
themselves.135 To more clearly see how and why humans are beings of
this sort, let’s imagine I have a friend named Ollie. As a rational human
agent, Ollie is unlike a leaf blown by the wind.136 That is, he is the sort of
being that has desires and beliefs about the world around him.137 These
mental faculties make it impossible for him to avoid self-consciously
reflecting on, and making decisions about, his perceptions of people and
things in his environment.138 For example, suppose he wants to plan a trip
130. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, supra note 5, at 1244.
131. The overemphasis of corrective justice on the remedial aspects of tort law “puts the cart before
the horse: primary tort obligations not to inflict wrongful harm are antecedent to and grounding of tort
law’s remedial responsibilities of repair.” Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?, supra note 5, at 369.
132. Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 37.
133. Id.
134. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 19, at 135, 140–41; DERYCK BEYLEVELD, THE
DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY: AN ANALYSIS AND DEFENSE OF ALAN GEWIRTH’S ARGUMENT
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY xxxvi, 1 (1991) [hereinafter BEYLEVELD, THE DIALECTICAL
NECESSITY OF MORALITY].
135. White, If You Can Understand This Essay, supra note 35, at 162.
136. Wayne A. Davis, The Causal Theory of Action, in THE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ACTION 32–35 (Timothy O’Connor & Constantine Sandis eds., 2010) [hereinafter Davis, The Causal
Theory of Action].
137. Id. at 34–35; CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, SELF-CONSTITUTION: AGENCY, IDENTITY, AND
INTEGRITY 105 (2009) [hereinafter KORSGAARD, SELF-CONSTITUTION].
138. Davis, The Causal Theory of Action, supra note 136, at 32–35; KORSGAARD, SELFCONSTITUTION, supra note 137, at 1–2.
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to Boston. Ollie can choose to not act on his desire to visit Boston, or he
can purchase tickets and pack his bags. But, so long as Ollie is in control
of his own faculties, he is inescapably faced with decisions about how to
act.139
The second important concept is the dialectically necessary argument
Gewirth uses to make the case for the principle of generic consistency.
The method of dialectical necessity “begins from assumptions, opinions,
statements, or claims made by protagonists or interlocutors and then
proceeds to examine what these logically imply.”140 To see this method
in action, let’s suppose that the reason Ollie wants to visit Boston is
because it is his favorite city. Based on that claim, he is also committed
to either denying that Philadelphia is his favorite city or revising his
earlier claim concerning Boston.141 Similarly, Gewirth’s argument for the
principle of generic consistency begins with a premise accepted by
someone like Ollie and proceeds to examine what else Ollie must accept
upon pain of contradiction.142
These concepts position us to consider the argument for the principle
of generic consistency, which proceeds in three stages.143 According to
the first stage, because Ollie is a prospective purposive agent, he has to
act in pursuit of a goal he sets for himself.144 Further, whatever goal Ollie
sets for himself, he needs at least a modicum of freedom and wellbeing.145 If the goal Ollie sets for himself is visiting Boston, he wouldn’t
be able to act in pursuit of his goal if I were to knock him unconscious
and lock him in a trunk.146 Although Ollie needs a variety of goods—such
as transportation, financial resources, and more—to act in pursuit of this
particular goal of visiting Boston, his most fundamental needs are the
requisite amount of freedom and well-being. 147 Indeed, a minimum
amount of freedom and well-being are the most basic or generic goods all
rational agents need to achieve their goals, whatever those ends might

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

KORSGAARD, SELF-CONSTITUTION, supra note 137, at 1–2.
GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 19, at 43.
See White, If You Can Understand This Essay, supra note 35, at 167.
Id.
Thom Brooks & Diana Sankey, Beyond Reason: The Legal Importance of Emotions, in
ETHICAL RATIONALISM AND THE LAW 132–33 (Patrick Capps & Shaun D Pattinson eds., 2017)
[hereinafter Brooks & Sankey, Beyond Reason].
144. See Ari Kohen, The Possibility of Secular Human Rights: Alan Gewirth and the Principle of
Generic Consistency, 7 HUM. RTS. REV. 49, 56 (2005) [hereinafter Kohen, The Possibility of Secular
Human Rights]; BEYLEVELD, THE DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY, supra note 134, at 21;
Beyleveld, The Principle of Generic Consistency, supra note 28, at 3–4.
145. See Kohen, The Possibility of Secular Human Rights, supra note 144, at 56–57; BEYLEVELD,
THE DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY, supra note 134, at 21–24.
146. See White, If You Can Understand This Essay, supra note 35, at 163.
147. See GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 19, at 60–63.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 4

168

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91

be.148 For example, an aspiring Olympian needs specialized training
facilities not required by an agent whose goal is to become an
accountant. 149 Nevertheless, whatever contingent goals rational human
agents might have, they all require a sufficient amount of freedom and
well-being.150
If Ollie accepts the arguments in stage one, the second stage commits
him to affirming that he has a right to freedom and well-being, which he
needs to act in pursuit of any goals he sets for himself. 151 Of course,
Ollie’s trip to Boston might be merely a contingent good that is not
essential to his continuing to be a prospective purposive agent. 152
However, whatever goods are essential to Ollie’s being an agent of a
particular kind, he must recognize that he needs a modicum of freedom
and well-being.153 Based on this recognition, Ollie is dialectically
committed to also accepting that he has rights to a sufficient level of
freedom and well-being. 154 After all, Ollie would contradict himself if he
were to “accept both that he must have freedom and well-being and that
other persons may interfere with his having these.”155
Pursuant to the third stage, Ollie is dialectically committed to
acknowledging that all prospective purposive agents have a right to
freedom and well-being. 156 This is so because Ollie recognizes that his
being a certain sort of rational human agent justifies his claiming a right
to these generic goods. 157 To the extent Ollie regards his possession of
certain characteristics that make him the sort of agent condemned to act
in pursuit of some goal(s) he sets for himself, he must accept that all other
agents possessing those characteristics have the same rights he does.158
Hence, all rational human agents contradict themselves if they claim
rights for themselves and fail to respect those same claim-rights asserted

148. Id.
149. Id. at 61.
150. Donald H. Regan, Gewirth on Necessary Goods: What Is the Agent Committed to Valuing?,
in GEWIRTH: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON ACTION, RATIONALITY, AND COMMUNITY 46 (Michael Boylan ed.,
1999).
151. See Brooks & Sankey, Beyond Reason, supra note 143, at 133; Beyleveld, The Principle of
Generic Consistency, supra note 28, at 3, 5; Kohen, The Possibility of Secular Human Rights, supra note
144, at 57; BEYLEVELD, THE DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY, supra note 134, at 24–42.
152. See White, If You Can Understand This Essay, supra note 35, at 163.
153. Id. at 163–65.
154. See GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 19, at 63, 66; Kohen, The Possibility of
Secular Human Rights, supra note 144, at 57.
155. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 19, at 81.
156. See Brooks & Sankey, Beyond Reason, supra note 143, at 133; Beyleveld, The Principle of
Generic Consistency, supra note 28, at 3, 5–6.
157. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 19, at 109–11.
158. See id. at 112; BEYLEVELD, THE DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY, supra note 134, at
44; White, If You Can Understand This Essay, supra note 35, at 163–67.
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by others who possess relevantly similar characteristics, which serve as
the foundation of their own rights.159
To briefly summarize, the principle of generic consistency provides the
rational standard guiding all practical reasoning.160 This guidance
commits rational human agents to recognizing, on pain of contradiction,
that we need—and have a right to—the minimum amount of freedom and
well-being required to constitute our agency by acting in pursuit of some
goal we set for ourselves.161 Further, we contradict ourselves if we deny
that because the needs we have as rational human agents provide the
justificatory foundation of the rights we claim for ourselves, any other
agents with the same needs have rights to the same goods.162 In this way,
the principle of generic consistency provides the rational standard
governing the rights we, as rational human agents, claim for ourselves and
the duties we have with respect to one another. 163 In other words,
Gewirth’s theory supplies a framework for articulating the obligations
governing all human action.164
Now that we have a high-level outline for the principle of generic
consistency on the table, we can examine what it means for law. If the
principle of generic consistency is the rational standard governing all
human action, we can think of our legal obligations that result from the
human activity of lawmaking as a subset or branch of the actions subject
to the principle of generic consistency’s governance.165 To better see how
our legal obligations could be a branch of a broader range of actions
subject to the principle of generic consistency, let’s consider a few
examples.
Suppose I promised my friend Ollie that I would attend his party.166 In
such a scenario, I have an obligation of the promissory sort, and my
obligation arises in the context of my friendship with Ollie.167 Now,
imagine that my mother becomes ill, and I have to miss Ollie’s party to
take her to the hospital.168 I might explain and justify my absence to Ollie
by appealing to my family obligation to care for my sick mother.169 Like

159. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 19, at 135.
160. BEYLEVELD AND BROWNSWORD, BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW, supra note 24, at 3.
161. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 19, at 63–66.
162. Id. at 135.
163. BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT, supra note 28, at 120, 170, 180.
164. Id.; Beyleveld, The Principle of Generic Consistency, supra note 28, at 2.
165. Beyleveld, The Principle of Generic Consistency, supra note 28, at 2; Scott Hershovitz, The
End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1198 (2015) [hereinafter Hershovitz, The End of
Jurisprudence].
166. See Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, supra note 165, at 1187.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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my obligation to attend Ollie’s party, I owe my mother an obligation,
albeit one that arises in the context of a family relationship.170 Scott
Hershovitz suggests that this example illustrates how we can have
obligations that arise in the context of, and are indexed to, different sorts
of relationships or contexts (e.g., work, family, friendship, and more). 171
He claims that we can say the same sort of thing about our legal
obligations, which are just obligations arising in contexts where our
conduct is subject to legal regulation.172
If law is a specific sort of context in which we give and receive reasons
for action, the principle of generic consistency is helpful for
understanding the nature and validity of our legal obligations. In this way,
the principle of generic consistency has promising implications for the
debate between economic tort theorists and their critics. Insofar as the
principle of generic consistency is the supreme principle governing all
law, it can serve as the foundation for tort law’s primary rights and assist
in shaking loose the grip that the schism between economic theorists and
their critics has on our understanding of tort theory.
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY
AND TORT LAW
The principle of generic consistency can justify tort law’s bilateral and
backward-looking structure in a way that forward-looking economic
theories of the field cannot.173 Tort law aims to recognize and protect
people’s fundamental rights.174 These rights are not merely ways to
incentivize people to take cost-justified precautions to maximize the
wealth available to society.175 A rights-based conception of tort law
recognizes that the field’s primary task is to articulate and protect the
fundamental rights people have with respect to one another.176 The
principle of generic consistency provides an account of the primary rights
serving as the foundation of tort law.177 Redress is required when such
rights are violated. Importantly, what is required is not simply “repair in
the air” against nobody in particular or against the cheapest cost
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1187–92.
173. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 329; Keating, Sovereign or
Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 44; Goldberg & Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility in the Law of Torts,
supra note 97, at 257; Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note 1, at 2.
174. Gardner, Tort Law and Its Theory, supra note 2, at 22.
175. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 330–31.
176. Id. at 330.
177. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY, supra note 19, at 112; see also BEYLEVELD, THE
DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY, supra note 134, at 44; White, supra note 35, at 163–67.
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avoider.178 Rather, the reparative obligation demanded by the principle of
generic consistency and tort law calls for redress against the particular
individual responsible for the wrong. 179 For these reasons, the principle
of generic consistency can explain the bilateral and backward-looking
structure of tort law in ways that economic efficiency cannot, and it
therefore appears to provide a preferable conception of the field.
Additionally, the principle of generic consistency provides a robust
account of tort law’s primary rights in a way that corrective justice does
not.180 At this point, it is worth noting that the conception of corrective
justice we have been considering thus far has been a “thin” version.181
Because the thin account is narrowly concerned with the remedial aspect
of tort law, it is particularly susceptible to the challenge that it fails to
justify tort law’s primary norms.182 Some theorists have attempted to
blunt the force of this critique by developing what has come to be known
as the “thick” account of the theory. Attributable to Ernest Weinrib, who
stands alongside Coleman as one of the two most prominent defenders of
corrective justice,183 the thick version of the theory grounds tort law’s
primary norms in the Kantian conception of right.184 For Kant, simply by
virtue of being a certain kind of agent, people have rights, which means
they are free to make plans and act in pursuit of the goals they set for
themselves without undue restriction from others. 185 Further, insofar as
being a certain sort of agent grounds people’s right to freedom, they must
acknowledge that other agents like them also have identical rights. 186
One’s violation of another’s rights is a wrong, to which corrective justice
provides a correlative response.187 Importantly, Weinrib doesn’t believe
that the violation of the primary right and the correlative remedial
obligation are separate.188 Instead, the violation of the primary right is a
violation of corrective justice.189 Put slightly differently, “the role of
178. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, supra note 97, at 66–67.
179. Id.
180. Supra Section I.C.
181. Zoe Sinel, Through Thick and Thin: The Place of Corrective Justice in Unjust Enrichment, 31
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 551, 553 (2011) [hereinafter Sinel, Through Thick and Thin].
182. Id. at 553.
183. Keating, Repair Wrongful Losses?, supra note 5, at 375; Keating, The Priority of Respect Over
Repair, supra note 10, at 301.
184. Sinel, Through Thick and Thin, supra note 181, at 556.
185. Zoe Sinel, Concerns about Corrective Justice, 26 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 137, 143 (2013)
[hereinafter Sinel, Concerns].
186. Id.; WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 7, at 58.
187. Sinel, Concerns, supra note 185, at 143; Ernest Weinrib, The Structure of Unjustness, 92
B.U.L. REV. 1062, 1068 (2012).
188. Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note 1, at 23.
189. Id. As Weinrib puts it, “corrective justice serves a normative function: a transaction is required,
on pain of rectification, to conform to its contours.” WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 7,
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corrective justice is not confined to the remedial relation between the
plaintiff and defendant but should be understood as constituting their
relationship from the very beginning.”190 Rather than thinking of the
violation of a primary right as a condition or trigger for the remedy
provided by corrective justice, the thick account of the theory conceives
of the violation as a (perhaps the) reason for the remedy.191 Hence,
pursuant to the thick account, corrective justice only ever responds to
prior instances of corrective injustice.192
Although the thick account is interesting, it doesn’t seem quite right to
call violations of primary rights instances of corrective justice.193 To be
sure, because the violation of a right requires a remedy, rights and
remedies are reciprocal.194 However, remedies are governed by and
subordinate to rights, the latter of which fix the contours of the remedies
owed in response to the violation of a right.195 It appears correct to say
that the theory provides an accurate account of the obligation to provide
a remedy when a primary right has been violated. 196 But even the thick
version of the view does nothing to ground primary rights.197 Certain
wrongs, such as strict liability, could be characterized as matters of
corrective justice all the way down because in such instances, the wrong
just is not repairing a harm that has occurred. 198 Yet, it is hard to see the
violation of rights like those involved in torts of nuisance or defamation
as matters of corrective justice.199 In such instances, corrective justice is
only implicated once primary rights have been violated. 200 In this way,
primary rights are analytically prior to remedies.201 Further, whereas the
obligations of corrective justice are bilateral insofar as they concern the
relation between the person who was wronged and the person responsible
for the wrong, primary rights are omnilateral and owed to everyone at all
times.202 Remedies play a big role in tort law, but they do so because tort
at 76 n.9.
190. Sinel, Through Thick and Thin, supra note 181, at 553; see also Richard W. Wright,
Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 631–34 (1992); ALLAN BEEVER, REDISCOVERING
THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 41–70 (2007) [hereinafter BEEVER, REDISCOVERING THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE].
191. Sinel, Through Thick and Thin, supra note 181, at 558.
192. Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note 1, at 23.
193. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 319 n.70.
194. Id. at 311, 319–20.
195. Id. at 311.
196. Sinel, Concerns, supra note 185, at 145.
197. Id.
198. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 319 n.70.
199. Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note 1, at 24.
200. Id.
201. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 318.
202. Id. at 308; Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV.
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law is fundamentally about primary rights. 203 It seems right to place
wrongs at the center of tort law, but it is not correct to claim that repairing
wrongs is the fundamental purpose of tort law.204 Rather, the primary aim
of tort law is to articulate and recognize the primary obligations we owe
each other, and these obligations are founded upon the fundamental rights
we have as free, rational, and equal human agents.205 For these reasons,
“remedies are the handmaidens of rights,”206 the latter of which are
founded on the principle of generic consistency.
If the principle of generic consistency is the rational standard
governing all human action,207 we can think of our legal obligations that
result from the human activity of lawmaking as a subset or branch 208 of
the actions subject to the principle of generic consistency’s governance.
In this way, the principle of generic consistency can serve as the
foundation for tort law’s primary rights. By doing so, the principle of
generic consistency can overcome the difficulty defenders of corrective
justice have in providing an account of tort law’s primary rights.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF GENERIC CONSISTENCY
Before concluding, it is worth noting that the principle of generic
consistency is not the only conception of tort law’s primary rights. Partly
in response to the fundamental schism identified by Keating, Gardner, and
others, several scholars have developed rights-based theories in recent
years. 209 The rights-based analysis of tort law is perhaps best summed up
by Robert Stevens. He claims that the whole of private law, including tort
law, “is simply about the rights we have one against another.”210 This
approach to tort law is typified by a few characteristics: a structural211
focus on the unifying theme(s) that underlie tort law and render the field
intelligible; a monist212 understanding of all213—rather than some parts—
67, 101–02 (2010).
203. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, supra note 10, at 311.
204. Id. at 311–12, 315.
205. Id. at 318.
206. Id. at 320.
207. Beyleveld, The Principle of Generic Consistency, supra note 28, at 2.
208. Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, supra note 165, at 1179–81.
209. See Nolan & Robertson, Rights and Private Law, supra note 3, at 1. Although a rights-based
analysis lends itself to all of private law, the law of torts has been the primary focus of many scholars. Id.
210. Robert Stevens, The Conflict of Rights, in THE GOALS OF PRIVATE LAW 139, 141 (A Robertson
and HW Tang eds., 2009).
211. STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS, supra note 15, at vii; WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW,
supra note 7, at 19.
212. BEEVER, REDISCOVERING THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, supra note 190, at 30.
213. Robert Stevens identifies misfeasance as “an exception to the rule that the deliberate infliction
of loss, absent the violation of a right, is not actionable.” STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS, supra note 15, at
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of tort law in terms of rights; a formalist214 view of structural concepts
determining the result of particular cases; and an interpretive215 account
of tort law. Although the scope of this article won’t permit a
comprehensive discussion of these various theories, I will briefly consider
what has become perhaps the most well-known rights-based account of
tort law: Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg’s civil recourse theory. 216
According to civil recourse theory, tort law is typified by two main
prongs.217 The first prong is relational. Goldberg and Zipursky claim that
tort law is relational insofar as it concerns mistreatment between
parties.218 They view all of tort law’s directives as relational in some sense
or another because they “always enjoin certain actors from doing certain
things to certain others, or to do certain things for certain others.”219
The second key feature of tort law identified by Goldberg and
Zipursky focuses on the role played by courts with respect to the
relational aspect of the field. 220 Civil recourse theory views tort law as
enabling “a wronged party to have a proportional response to a
wrong.”221 Goldberg and Zipursky conceive of the field as
empowering people to leverage the judicial system to hold another
accountable for a wrong. 222 Empowering citizens to utilize “the state’s
dispute-resolution mechanisms” obviates the need for one to respond
to a wrong through other means of self-help.223 This empowerment
aspect of civil recourse is a crucial feature of “what makes it
reasonable to accept being subjected laws and state control.” 224
242.
214. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 7, at 11, 29–46; BEEVER, REDISCOVERING
supra note 190, at 3, 34–35, 39, 71. Understandably, rights-based theorists in
the United States are keen to contrast their theory of tort law with the legal realist project, which views
tort law as tool used by government officials for pursuing policy objectives. See Goldberg & Zipursky,
Rights and Responsibility in the Law of Torts, supra note 97, at 256. Although some rights-based theorists
take a hard stance on there being any instrumental role for social policy in tort law, others believe that
although rights should be the primary concern of tort law, public-interest considerations can be relevant
to tort claims under certain circumstances. See Stephen Perry, The Role of Duty of Care in a Rights-Based
Theory of Negligence Law, in THE GOALS OF PRIVATE LAW 83 (A Robertson and HW Tang eds., 2009);
Nicholas J. McBride, Rights and the Basis of Tort Law, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 339–41 (Donal
Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012).
215. STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS, supra note 15, at vii; BEEVER, REDISCOVERING THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE, supra note 190, at 21.
216. JOHN C. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020) [hereinafter
GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS].
217. Id. at 4, 25 n.5.
218. Id. at 25 n.5.
219. Id. at 93.
220. Id. at 108.
221. Id. at 3, 69–70.
222. Id. at 3, 70.
223. Id. at 123.
224. Id. at 127.
THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE,
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According to Goldberg and Zipursky, the ability of individuals to
leverage the court system to rectify unfair interactions rivals the right
to vote in its importance to liberal democracies founded on “notions of
equality, fairness and individual independence and sovereignty.” 225
There is much more to say for and about civil recourse, which has
drawn significant attention in recent years. However, for our purposes,
perhaps the most important characteristic of civil recourse and other
rights-based theories is their interpretive aim. As interpretivist
projects, many contemporary rights-based analyses of tort law purport
to provide an account of the field “as it stands.” 226 Drawing on H.L.A.
Hart’s notion of the internal point of view, Goldberg and Zipursky
claim that laws qualify as valid because of their being created through
the “right” sort of social processes, which officials in that legal system
regard as validity-conferring.227 Examples of such social processes
might include a state legislature passing, and the governor signing, a
bill requiring automobile owners in that state to carry a minimum
amount of insurance.228 Importantly, the internal point does not regard
the legitimacy of legal rules as necessarily depending on the moral
value of such rules. 229 Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge that
although certain principles of rationality and reasonableness have been
codified into law by legislators and jurists, “the civil recourse principle
does not itself provide an account of tort law’s wrongs”230 or “put
forward an account of what the ideal law would be.” 231
The interpretive focus of rights-based tort theories seems to be a
crucial limitation because it does not tell us anything about why and
how law should be reformed. Interpretive theories of tort law are useful
insofar as there is value in first understanding the law marked for
reform before revising any law(s) in a particular legal system. 232
Nevertheless, interpretive theories do not provide the conceptual
resources to determine whether laws are undesirable and, if so, what
should be done. Granted, according to civil recourse theory, a judge’s
decision might be “bad” or “mistaken” because it misinterpreted or
failed to apply settled precedent, which is entitled to deference if it was
225. Id. at 125.
226. See Nolan and Robertson, Rights and Private Law, supra note 3, at 6.
227. GOLDBERG AND ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS, supra note 216, at 91, 96–97; Scott J.
Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1157–59 (2006) [hereinafter
Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?].
228. GOLDBERG AND ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS, supra note 216, at 91.
229. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, supra note 227, at 1159.
230. GOLDBERG AND ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS, supra note 216, at 26, 96 n.18, 230, 234;
see also Nolan and Robertson, Rights and Private Law, supra note 3, at 10.
231. Nolan and Robertson, Rights and Private Law, supra note 3, at 5–6.
232. STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 6 (2004).
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enacted pursuant to the relevant social facts recognized as valid by
some set of persons within that legal system.233 Goldberg and Zipursky
claim that settled doctrine deserves deference because if the “power to
override the law” is “exercised too sparingly,” the legal officials and
the law they are charged with upholding will lose credibility. 234
However, defending the claim that it is bad for legal systems to lose
credibility requires normative resources (e.g., conceptions of fairness
or justice) that interpretive theories lack. A theory of tort law that is
too interpretive risks failing to be sufficiently prescriptive, which is
needed for developing and normative conclusions as to how to revise
the law(s) in question.235
This is where the principle of generic consistency can be helpful.
According to Gewirth’s theory, law is in need of reform when it fails
to satisfy fundamental principles of rationality and reasonableness.
The principle of generic consistency provides a foundation for the
rights owed to all human agents and the rights that tort law protects.
Gewirth’s theory stipulates the criteria that valid laws cannot violate,
regardless of their social pedigree. Granted, if the principle of generic
consistency is to be leveraged to provide a prescriptive theory of how
the law of a particular legal system should be reformed, it will need to
be attentive to the existing practices of that institution.236 After all, a
purely normative theory that ignores “the structure and history” of tort
law in a particular jurisdiction “is an impossibility: it is a theory of
something else.”237 Civil recourse and other rights-based theorists
seem correct to attend to the interpretive task of understanding the law
of a particular legal system. But they do not provide the normative
resources needed to determine how and when law should be reformed.
For this reason, the principle of generic consistency offers an
improvement over civil recourse insofar as the former claims the
validity of legal rules depends on considerations regarding
fundamental principles of reason.
To be sure, the principle of generic consistency is not the only available
account of tort law’s primary rights. Ernest Weinrib, Arthur Ripstein, and
others have developed rich Kantian theories of law that rival Gewirth’s
theory.238 Keating’s Rawlsian conception of the role played by fairness in

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

GOLDBERG AND ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS, supra note 216, at 97, 269–70.
Id. at 269–70.
Felipe Jiménez, Two questions for private law theory, 12 JURIS. 391, 394 (2021).
Id.
Id.
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 7; ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND
FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2019); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS
(2016).
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tort law is also worth comparing to the principle of generic consistency. 239
The task of carefully considering the principle of generic consistency on
its own merits240 and the degree to which it is preferable to other tort
theories deserves further attention in future projects.
CONCLUSION
In America, debate over the foundations of tort law is burdened by a
schism between economic theorists and those defending corrective
justice.241 Scholars on each side of this dispute have legitimate criticisms
of their opponents.242 Unfortunately, economic theorists and their critics
have devoted too much attention to refining their respective critiques and
too little time on setting the stage for resolving the dispute. 243
I propose that we can make progress toward overcoming the schism by
providing a justification of tort law’s primary norms.244 The principle of
generic consistency can help accomplish this task. Gewirth’s theory
provides a rational standard determining the rightness and wrongness of
all human conduct, including the enterprise of guiding human conduct
through the creation of legal rules.245 As such, the principle of generic
consistency can serve as the rational foundation for the primary rights and
duties at the heart of tort law. In this way, Gewirth’s theory can overcome
the difficulty corrective justice theorists have in providing an account of
tort law’s primary rights. Further, the principle of generic consistency can
explain tort law’s backward-looking concern with remedying wrongs in a
way that economic theorists cannot.
This article does not explore the implications the principle of generic
consistency has for tort law’s doctrinal dimensions. Instead, my goals
here are more preliminary and focused on the principle of generic
consistency’s ability to illuminate our understanding of tort law’s
conceptual roots. If I am on the right track, future projects examining the
connection between the principle of generic consistency and tort law’s
doctrinal thickets will be worth the effort.

239. Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV.
311 (1996).
240. See Deryck Beyleveld, Korsgaard v. Gewirth on Universalization: Why Gewerthians are
Kantians and Kantians Ought to be Gewirthians, 11 J. MORAL PHIL. 573 (2014); BEYLEVELD, THE
DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF MORALITY, supra note 134, at 65–396; GEWIRTH: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON
ACTION, RATIONALITY, AND COMMUNITY (Michael Boylan ed., 1999).
241. Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1, supra note 1, at 2.
242. Gardner, Tort Law and Its Theory, supra note 2, at 1.
243. Keating, Sovereign or Subordinate?, supra note 8, at 37.
244. Id. at 52.
245. BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT, supra note 28, at 120, 170, 180.
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